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Abstract
This research hinges upon the relationship between fiscal decentralization (FD) and
subjective well-being (SWB) in Chile. We merge data from two household surveys
(2011 and 2013) in which a life satisfaction question was included, with municipallevel information. By using a FD proxy that measures the share of municipal
unconditional grants on all revenues, we produce an instrumental variable to test in
the context of an ordered logistic multilevel model. Our contribution is twofold.
First, we find evidence that, on average, FD does affect SWB positively. Second,
we find this effect to depend on the satisfaction group in which individuals belong.
Evidence from this study indicates that the effect in question is non-linear and that
only high SWB groups are clearly benefitted. Since this reflects different priorities
across SWB groups, this paper’s evidence is a call for a more aggressive intermunicipal fiscal equalization scheme.

* This work was supported by CONICYT Scientific and Technological Research Commission (Grant FONDECYT
N. 1171464, Chile), Proyectos de Exelencia from the Junta de Andalucìa (PAIDI: P18-TP-4475) and Proyectos
I+D+i from the Programa Operativo FEDER de Analucìa (A-SEJ-154-UGR18).
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Introduction
It has been argued that decentralization in general—and fiscal decentralization (FD) in
particular—may enhance the quality of local public goods (Oates 1972). The theoretical
literature has provided numerous well-known hypotheses that support this. Among others, it has
been argued that decentralization takes advantage of a more accurate knowledge of local
authorities about their own constituency (Hayek 1945); that it encourages stronger accountability
to people (Seabrihgt 1996, Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2014); and that it raises the likelihood of
more innovation in the design of effective public policies (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Kotsogiannis
and Schwager 2006), among other factors. Nonetheless, the down side of decentralization has
been widely documented (e.g., Treisman 2007, Boffa et al. 2016). The main caveats include
public policy coordination problems, potential for moral hazard when the national level is seen
as an insurance of last resort (Letelier 2011), scant professional expertise among subnational
public personnel, and a higher likelihood of elite capture and corruption (Prud’homme 1995,
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). In light of this debate, an extensive but not fully conclusive
empirical literature has been developed to provide evidence on the likely effects of FD on a wide
number of areas (e.g., Ahmad and Brosio 2009, Letelier 2012).
Our research builds upon previous empirical studies that show a systematic positive
relationship between decentralization and life satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002;
Bjørnskov et al. 2008; Hessami 2010; Voigt and Blume 2012; Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose
2012; and Sujarwoto and Tampubolon 2015). While results generally confirm the hypothesis that
subnational autonomy improves individuals’ life satisfaction, some relevant research questions
are still unattended. First, there is the challenge as to how we can properly measure this
autonomy, as it entails fiscal, administrative and political dimensions. This research focuses on
2

the fiscal dimension of decentralization, as it uses the share of unconditional grants on all
municipal revenues as a proxy of FD. Despite this measurement being of particular relevance for
the case of Chile, our findings have important policy implications on the subject matter. Second,
the potential benefits of FD are usually assumed to be distributed homogenously across
individuals, regardless of the access to local public services they have. Based upon a pooled
database that combines two household surveys for 2011 and 2013 and a set of municipal-level
indicators for 345 municipalities, we show evidence that FD only affects subjective well-being
(SWB) positively for those who exhibit a high degree of SWB. The opposite occurs with lowSWB individuals. This suggests that the benefits from municipal governments having more
budget control only become apparent when some minimally accepted local public goods
provision is reached. Before that occurs, having a larger share of revenues in the form of
unconditional grants does not lead to lower life satisfaction, as it probably brings the community
closer to that minimum.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. A review of the literature in presented in the
next section. Then, stylized facts on the case of Chile are presented. The following section
summarizes the existing empirical evidence, followed by the empirical analysis. The final section
concludes.
Theory and Hypotheses
Existing empirical literature has shown evidence of the influence of an ample array of
individual-level factors on SWB (more on this below). Nonetheless, both social and
environmental conditions play a role too. This may be expressed in the access to basic services,
the quality of community life and the perception that local representatives are aligned with their
constituency. In this respect, the extent to which local authorities are responsive to people’s
3

demands is likely a critical factor. It has been argued that said community orientation in local
governance can be strengthened by giving more power to subnational governments to decide,
which entails more political, administrative and fiscal decentralization.
As far as FD is concerned, this has been broadly defined as the empowerment of people
by the empowerment of their local governments (Bahl 2008). The specific fiscal component of
said definition entails the passing of budgetary power to elected authorities, either in the form of
more power to tax or to spend. Defenders of FD can be classified into two broad groups: those
who advocate its potential economic efficiency benefits, and those who highlight the
enhancement of governments’ accountability and better preference matching between local
residents and their representatives (Lockhood 2006). While the so-called “first generation” of
theoretical models was more inspired in the first approach (Oates 1972), the second generation is
clearly focused on the second one (Oates 2008). Whatever the argument, a more efficient
delivery of public services leads to better quality of local community services and/or more
control by the public on those who spend the budget. Nonetheless, some caveats to
decentralization are in order (Treisman 2007, Letelier and Saez 2013). Important ones are the
likelihood of elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006), poorly trained subnational
governments’ personnel (Prud'homme 1995) and wasted economies of scale (Oates 1985),
among other arguments.
However sound, the aforementioned hypotheses assume that FD affects people’s SWB
similarly, regardless of the original life satisfaction level of the individual in question.
Nonetheless, there is the chance that low-SWB individuals might be primarily concerned with
their access to some minimally accepted standard of local public services. Under a very unequal
inter-municipal distribution of local tax bases, those jurisdictions with scant resources and poor
4

chances of collecting taxes of their own are more likely to host a larger share of individuals who
assign more value to the level of municipal provision than to the quality of service delivery. The
lack of basic community services like garbage collection, primary health centers, access to parks,
and street maintenance and the like may induce citizens to prioritize a basic delivery level
regardless of its quality.
If we assume that FD may be captured by the share of all revenues over which local
authorities have some (or full) control, we may hypothesis that this share becomes a relevant
issue when full revenues exceed some threshold. Expectedly, individuals who reside in
jurisdictions with a poor provision of basic community services will value FD less than those
who live in zones where this provision is well attended. If this were the case, FD is likely to have
different effects on SWB for different SWB groups of individuals.
Fiscal Decentralization in Chile
Chile has a rather simple and quite centralized public finance administration model.
While an intermedium level of government does exist,1 only the municipal government is
formally recognized as “autonomous” in the Constitution. A national law defines the range of
administrative functions that municipal governments may exercise and the corresponding
responsibilities they confront.2 A parallel “Organic Municipal Revenue Law” establishes the type
of revenues that municipalities are entitled. A feature worth mentioning is that the law assigns all
municipal governments the same set of functions and it makes no inter-municipal differences as
far as sources of funding are concerned. At least potentially, all municipalities can perform the
same functions and exploit their tax base under the same set of rules.

Formally, Chile is divided into sixteen “regions” (intermedium level) and 345 municipal governments (local level).
This is the so-called “Organic Municipal Law,” in which the “organic” status implies that any change of the law requires a very
high quorum in parliament.
1
2
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Municipal revenues must be distributed among six exclusive functions and eleven
“shared” responsibilities with the national government. Exclusive responsibilities include local
development, urban planning, enforcement of the law on car traffic, construction and garbage
collection. Exclusive functions can be said to define a minimum set of local services that
municipalities are expected to provide. In contrast to this, shared responsibilities are vaguely
defined in the law as they leave ample space for innovation in key areas of local development.
Functions of this type include education, health, promotion of culture, tourism, public
transportation, urbanization and social development, among others. Because shared functions are
mostly exercised on a voluntary basis, we should expect this to occur as long as the set of
exclusive responsibilities are reasonably fulfilled. This is for example the case of school-level
education and primary health care in Chile, in which approximately 10 to 15 percent of the
funding is provided by the municipal level, albeit only more fiscally autonomous municipalities
contribute (e.g., Letelier and Ormeño 2018).
As for municipal revenues, the so-called “Own Permanent Revenues” (IPP) stand for all
taxes or charges levied on residents and local economic activities. This includes licenses on
businesses, casinos, water rights, cars, mining activities,3 and fines on road traffic rules
violations. The most important single source is the property tax, which stands for 26 percent of
all revenues. Complementary to the IPP, municipal governments receive a compensation
unconditional grant called the Common Municipal Fund (FCM). This originates in a fund made
of contributions from all municipalities, which is then returned to them based on a formula that
gives a higher share to those with a lower tax base and/or poor socioeconomic indicators.4 On
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Casino and water licenses are shared with the regional governments (Letelier 2019).
The FCM is based on a constitutional mandate. A formula determines the way the fund is made up and the corresponding intermunicipal distribution criteria.
4
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average, the FCM stood for 55.2 percent of all municipal revenues in 2013. Since tax bases and
local living conditions exhibit a very unequal distribution across the country, the distribution of
the FCM itself is very uneven. At one end, 15 percent of the poorest municipalities get more than
80 percent of their whole revenues from the FCM. At the other end, the richest 15 percent get 28
percent or less from this same fund.5 Despite this redistribution fund making a significant
contribution to inter-municipal equity, it is far from achieving full equalization. While the intermunicipal GINI lowers from 0.50 to 0.45 (Ahmad et al. 2015), huge differences remain in the
quality of local public goods. In this respect, the case of education has been widely reported, as
numerous studies have been made to identify main sources of inter-municipal variation in school
quality.
The Existing Evidence
Non-Institutional Factors
A myriad of specific factors have been found to be responsible for SWB. A review by
Dolan et al. (2009) suggests that a comprehensive list should at least include income, age,
gender, ethnicity, education, heath, labor status, marital status, religion and the number of sons,
among others. A global study by Diego-Rosell et al. (2016) shows evidence that the most
important factor is material well-being, which stands for 16.6 percent of the variance of life
satisfaction. Interestingly, the community context appears to be the second most important one
(5.5 percent of the variance). As far as specific variables are concerned, absolute personal
income appears to have a positive—albeit decreasing—effect (Stevenson and Wolfers 2013).
Nonetheless, the influence of local culture and other idiosyncratic features may have a significant

5

Reported data correspond to the revenues net of FCM contribution. If gross revenues (before FCM contribution) were used, the
net contribution of the FCM would be negative for rich municipalities.
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role to play, as the effect of income and other variables is likely to be stronger in more
competitive societies (e.g., Tsurumi, Imauji and Managi 2019). Regarding the Latin American
case, this appears to be relatively happier with respect to the world (World Happiness Report
2019). A collection of studies highlight specific drivers of SWB on the region (Rojas 2016).
Important ones are family ties, gratifying human relations, social network and other non-income
related factors. The so-called social capital, defined as the access to social networks, has been
also found to affect SWB (e.g., Han 2013). We should expect that said networks would deepen
people’s trust in each other, facilitate the enforcement of informal agreements and bring wellbeing to the community as a whole.
As far as the Chilean case is concerned, a number of studies intend to explore main
determinants of like satisfaction on specific groups, as is the case of workers, elderly people and
students. A study by Loewe et al. (2014) use a sample of 530 workers to explain seven life
domains built upon 21 individual indicators usually considered relevant. This study provides
evidence showing that the financial situation is a predominant factor for workers, which is in line
with the case of emerging economies in general. Interestingly, they also find that workers’
satisfaction with family is highly correlated with global SWB. As for the specific case of “job
satisfaction,” some evidence suggests that other workers’ income may reduce own income
satisfaction (Montero and Rau 2016), which reinforces the view that regardless of the analytical
context, individual income should be measured relative to a group. Under the assumption that
Chile has a “collectivistic” orientation, these authors interpret said result in support of the
hypothesis that local culture matters. Further confirmation that job satisfaction partially depends
on where people resides is provided by Ferrada (2017), who finds that, after controlling for a
number of relevant variables, workers on the country’s north zone have a higher SWB. Another
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group being analyzed is university students in Chile. Berta et al. (2015) find that family support
significantly affects interviewees’ SWB. As expected, some local evidence confirms that age
segments are sensitive to specific types of variables. A study based on a sample of elderly people
in Chile by Herrera et al. (2011) shows that this group’s SWB is particularly responsive to selfefficacy, good quality of social relations and a number of daily routines. As opposed to the group
specific focus of previous studies, Hojman and Miranda (2018) explore the effect of individual
“agency” as defined by Sen (e.g., Sen 1999), and human dignity (“shame”) on SWB. They base
their analysis on a special survey on “Other Dimensions of Household Quality of Life” for Chile.
Their results show that both agency and shame are significant. In particular, “freedom to
decide”—in the spirit of Sen´s hypothesis—appears to be as powerful to predict SWB as income
itself.
One aspect of subjective well-being that deserves attention is the access to basic services
such as schools, hospitals, recreational facilities and the like. This is closely related to the
capacity of local authorities to provide some of these services itself and/or facilitate local
conditions for other tiers of government—or even private agents to assume responsibility for the
matter. An extensive literature exists about the factors that affect satisfaction in urban areas (e.g.,
Ibem 2013). Nonetheless, the role of basic service delivery has to be reconsidered when it comes
to a countrywide analysis. Deep gaps are expected in the type of services demanded in rural
versus urban areas. Needless to say, the type of geographical conditions of the commune in
question may to play a major role. In this regard, the access to hospitals is expected to be a
universal demand (e.g., Mohit 2018).

9

Institutional Factors and Decentralization
The role of institutional factors in a government’s performance has been the subject of
numerous theoretical and empirical contributions (e.g., Persson and Tebellini 2003). One
particular dimension of a country’s institutional structure is the extent to which the political,
administrative and fiscal powers are distributed across tiers of government. Since the early
1990s, an extensive list of studies have intended to answer the question of whether
decentralization is conducive to improvements in a government’s performance. The basic
hypothesis is that empowering subnational governments should make local authorities more
accountable to people (Seabright 1996), enhance public policy innovation (Rose-Ackerman
1980), avoid excessive taxation (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) and improve preference matching
between governments and citizens (Oates 1972), among other potential benefits. While most of
the available evidence hinges on the use of objective measurements of quality in public service
delivery (Letelier 2012), a more recent wave of empirical studies is focused on measurements of
SWB as an endogenous variable, this being the approach of this paper.
While the analysis of the effect of institutions on SWB is still new, even newer is the
concern about the effect of decentralization on said variable. Evidence can be divided between
cross-country studies and country-level ones. Among the first type, a pioneering research is
carried out by Frey and Stutzer (2000), in which the effect of decentralization and other related
institutional factors are examined for the case of Swiss regions. They conclude that government
initiatives, such as referenda and local autonomy, have a significant and positive effect on
people’s life satisfaction. A follow up study by Bjørnskov et al. (2008) matches 60,000
individual observations with 66 countries. Although revenue decentralization appears to have an
effect, expenditure decentralization affects SWB through a government’s consumption only.
10

Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) extended this analysis to a broader set of life
satisfaction measurements, in which the effect of decentralization on life satisfaction as a general
concept is compared to a similar exercise on satisfaction with the economic situation only. Four
out of five proxies of fiscal decentralization as well as political decentralization appear to affect
“general” SWB positively. Nevertheless, the effect on the remaining specific satisfaction
variables exhibit mixed—and in some cases negative—effects. By conducting factor analysis on
25 country variables, Voigt and Blume (2012) explore the multidimensional nature of federalism.
They provide evidence that fiscal decentralization related factors contribute to life satisfaction.
Along similar lines, a study by Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2019) based on 36 European
countries finds robust evidence that the effect of “political decentralization” on personal and
economic well-being is contingent on the quality of government, being generally positive for
countries with a low governmental quality.
As for the country-level evidence, Gao et. al. (2014) show that “revenue decentralization”
in China has a strong and robust effect on SWB. While this appears not to be the case as far as
“expenditure decentralization” is concerned, they interpret said result as an indication that
conditional transfers given to provinces, which are a large share of provincial budgets, impede
provinces executing a budget in line with people’s preferences. A similar study for Indonesia
suggests that, although fiscal decentralization appears to be significant in explaining SWB, this
does not hold in the case of political decentralization (Sujarwoto and Tampubolon 2015). Despite
no studies of this type being reported for Chile, Letelier and Ormeño (2018) show that municipal
fiscal decentralization on school education does improve students’ performance in standardized
national tests. Since most public schools are still under municipal administration in Chile, this
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can be taken as prima facie evidence of FD having some positive effect on life quality, and
presumably on SWB.
Empirical Analysis
The Empirical Model
The core of our empirical analysis hinges upon Y*, which is a latent and continuous
ordinal variable that represents individual life satisfaction. Since said variable is unobservable,
we replace it by a proxy called Y. This is based on a five-option measurement of life satisfaction
taken from the household survey (see below).6 Yijk is a realization of 𝑌𝑖 within cluster “j”
(𝑗 = 1,2,3. . 𝐽), which is hosted in cluster “k” (𝑘 = 1,2,3. . 𝐾). The correspondence between Yijk
and Y*ijk follows Eq. 1, in which Y*ijk may fall into R specific ranges bounded between 𝑘𝑟−1 and
𝑘𝑟 , where "𝑘" represents the cut points for each range. Formally, our empirical model can be
represented by the cumulative probability of Yijk being in a category higher than ”𝑟” (𝐸𝑞. 1).

Pr (𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 > 𝑟|𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑍𝑙𝑗𝑘, 𝑊𝑚𝑘, 𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘, 𝑉0𝑘 ) = 𝜔000 + ∑ 𝜔ℎ0𝑘 𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝜔0𝑙𝑞 𝑍𝑙𝑗𝑘 + ∑ 𝜔0𝑚𝑘 𝑊𝑚𝑘
ℎ

𝑙

𝑚

+𝑈0𝑗𝑘 + 𝑉0𝑘 + ∑ 𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘 𝑋ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 (𝐸𝑞. 1)
ℎ

where
∗
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑟−1 ≤ 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘
< 𝑘𝑟 ; 𝑟 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑅

In order to capture the structure of the data, three levels are identified. The first one is the
“municipal” level (Wk), which stands for the set of municipal-level variables that stay the same in
the two surveys (2011 and 2013). The second one is the “municipal-year” level (Zjk), which
6

The original survey questionnaire provides a 10 alternative option scale. Nonetheless, the use of so many options in a non-linear
model (ordered multilevel logit model) becomes difficult to interpret, and it does not pass the proportional odds assumption (see
below). In order to take advantage from a non-linear estimation, we grouped individual answers into five categories. This sort out
the above caveats, and it allows a better analysis of each category.
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controls for those municipal level variables that change between the two surveys. Finally, level
one stands for individuals level variables represented in the surveys (Xijk). Fixed effects are
accounted for inV0k (level 3) andU0jk (level 2). Random effects are caught in variable 𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑘 𝑋ℎ𝑗𝑘 .
We use the Newton-Rapshon algorithm to maximize the likelihood function, which is done
according to the adaptive quadrature procedure proposed by Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles
(2005).
Data Description
Definition and measurement of variables are provided in the Appendix. Data description
is reported in Table 2. As for the individual-level information, this is taken from the national
household surveys of 2011 and 2013 respectively (CASEN7), which provide 86,854 observations
for 2011, and 87,400 for 2013.8 These are the only versions of said survey in which an explicit
question about life satisfaction is included. Answers to that question are given in a five-options
scale that ranges from completely dissatisfied or little satisfied (1) to very satisfied or completely
satisfied (5). Its coefficient of variation (CV) is 0.38 in 2011 and 0.34 in 2013.
Among individual control variables, binary dummies were used in the cases of GENDER,
MARIRED-COUPLE, PRIMARY EDUCATION, SECONDARY EDUCATION, HIGHER
EDUCATION, UNEMPLOYED, RELIGION, INDIGENE and NEIGHBORHOOD-BOARD.
This last variable is expected to capture social capital, as it indicates whether the interviewee
belongs to an organized social group, such as a community-based organization, a political party,
a labor union or any other similar group. Variable HEALTH is measured in a seven-option
question. As for the dispersion of said variables, CV is equal or above 2.0 for HIGHER

7
8

The “Socio-Economic Characterization Survey” (CASEN) is made once every three years.
Regional and municipal expansion factors were used in the estimations.
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EDUCATION, UNEMPLOYED, RELIGION, INDIGENE, NEIGBORHOOD BOARD and
PERCENTILES OF INCOME. This same coefficient ranges between 1.0 and 2.0 for GENDER,
PRIMARY EDUCATION and HIGHER EDUCATION. Remaining individual variables have a
CV lower than 1.0. Our three municipal variables (FCM, FCM_INST and HOSPITAL ACSSES)
exhibit a relatively low variation with a CV below 0.5.
As far as our proxy of FD is concerned, this is expected to capture the extent to which
municipalities have some leeway to decide on the revenues they need to accomplish the mandate
defined by law. In the Chilean case, municipalities are very limited in their capacity to mobilize
resources of their own. Two main revenue sources can be distinguished: one is the IPP (see the
third section above), which correspond to 40 percent of all revenues. However small,
municipalities do have some room to decide on various determinants of that revenue, including
the case of business licenses and some other minor charges. They can also cooperate with the
National Tax Authority (Servicio de Impuesto Internos) in order to update the local cadaster and
redefine the local urban plan, which may have significant long-term consequences in the
property tax collection. On average, the remaining 60-percent share of municipal revenues is
made of transfers from the national government, of which the most important is the Fondo
Comun Municipal (FCM). We will use the share of the FCM on all municipal revenues,9 as an
indicator of the degree of municipal fiscal centralization. Notably, regardless of FD,
municipalities do have different levels of tax bases to attend local community needs.
Nonetheless, we will assume that each municipality’s random effect will control for this. Given
the nature of the FCM, the inclusion of a local tax-base proxy will be highly collinear with FCM.
Additionally, the inclusion of a variable that measures the full municipal revenue level is

9

In this case, “All municipal Revenues” stand for the so-called “Own Revenues.” They are the sum of the IPP plus the FCM.

14

unlikely to give a good account of the local potential access to better local public services, as
they are subject to significant economies of scale. Thus, low-populated communities may show a
high level of full revenues per head, but also show poor levels of service provision. This is for
example the case of education. There are 70 public schools in Chile that only have one student
who receives all benefits (Letelier and Ormeño 2018), but nonetheless, the educational output is
still low.
In order to explore the robustness of our empirical model further, an instrument will be
used to control for possible measurement errors of FCM, as well as other potential endogeneity
biases. In particular, it might be argued that individuals and families with certain happiness
profile are more likely to reside in certain communes. In dealing with that, we follow MartinezVasquez et al. (2011) and Sanogo (2019) in estimating an instrument for FCM. This consists of a
weighted average of the FCM, in which weights equal the inverse of the distance between the
municipality in question (“𝑖”) and all municipalities in a predetermined area (1⁄𝑑 ), over the
inverse of the sum of that same ratio across all municipalities but 𝑖. By construction,
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 should be correlated with FCM and not correlated to 𝜇𝑗 in Eq.1 above. Given the
structure of the country’s territory, municipalities are likely to share similar characteristics across
large geographic areas, in which the pattern of municipal tax revenues and tax bases exhibit
similar characteristics. At one end, the northern zone is mainly dominated by the mining industry
and it exhibits extended deserted zones. The opposite holds for the southern zone, in which water
is abundant and the local economic activity is largely dominated by agriculture. In between, the
central zone is where the bulk of the national economic activity is located and where most of the
population live. In view of this, we chose a value of "𝑑" equal to 500 kms, which is expected to
capture similarity across large geographical areas.
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𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑡 =

1
∑𝑛𝑗−1

𝑛

∑

1
𝑑𝑗 𝑗−1

1
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑗 𝑖≠𝑗 𝐸𝑞.2
𝑑𝑗

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Individual Variables: 1-level
HAPPY_5
GENDER
AGE
MARRIED-COUPLE
PRIMARY EDUCATION
SECONDARY EDUCATION
HIGHER EDUCATION
UNEMPLOYED
HEALTH
RELIGION
INDIGENE
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF INCOME
PERCENTILE 90-99 OF INCOME
Municipality-Time Variables: 2level
FCM
FCM_INST
Municipality Variables: 3-level
HOSPITAL ACCESS

Mean
2011
2013
2.774
2.935
0.354
0.345
46.799 47.759
0.590
0.575
0.344
0.327
0.438
0.434
0.184
0.207
0.040
0.037
2.663
4.442
0.096
0.093
0.117
0.118
0.114
0.105
3.578
3.442
1.185
1.238
1.441
1.432

Std. Dev.
2011
2013
1.050
1.003
0.478
0.475
17.805
17.712
0.492
0.494
0.475
0.469
0.496
0.496
0.388
0.405
0.195
0.190
1.213
1.312
0.295
0.290
0.321
0.322
0.318
0.307
1.719
1.673
3.525
3.669
4.338
4.316

2011
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

Min.
2013
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

Max.
20111
2013
4
4
1
1
104
108
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
26
19
13.744 13.775
17.187 16.911

43.459
34.904

43.041
37.138

21.538
13.733

21.663
12.826

1.29
5.737

0.890
5.662

98.490
57.154

96.940
59.268

0.870

0.882

0.184

0.181

0.011

0.011

1

1

Model Estimation
Equation 1 is estimated as a hierarchical ordinal logit model, in which the number of life
satisfaction categories (R) equals 5.10 Non-categorical variables are measured relative to the
municipal median (see Appendix). Model 1 is the base line model, in which no covariate is
included. In this case, we are assuming that individual SWB is only explained by the structure of

10

The original CASEN questionnaire gives interviewees 10 life satisfactions options for them chose. Nonetheless, the use of this
option in the context of an ordinal logit does not pass the proportional odds assumption and makes interpretation of results less
clear. In view of this, individuals’ answers were classified in only five life satisfaction groups.
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the data. Individual observations (level 1) are hosted into municipal-year data (level 2) and
municipal data (level 3). Model 2 adds individual-level covariates from the surveys being
considered. Model 3 adds municipal-level data. This is estimated in two versions. While version
“FCM” uses the original definition of FCM, version “FCM_inst” uses the instrument. A
“proportional odds” test is performed over a logistic non-hierarchical random-effect version of
model 3, which is reported as model 4. The corresponding χ2 (22.7) does not lead to reject the
null (no proportional odds) at 10-percent significance.
Concerning the relative quality of the statistical models, a cross-model comparison can be
made by looking at the AIC and BIC criterion. They unambiguously show the lowest value for
model 3 (FCM_inst), which enables us to focus on said model for further analysis. This pattern is
consistent with the value of the log likelihood models, the corresponding LR tests and the
variance of levels 2 and 3 random effects, as they are the lowest among models 1 to 3. As for the
ICC, results from model 3 suggest that levels 2 and 3 contribute with 4.3 percent of all three
levels’ variance, which confirms that level 1 variables explain most of the variation of individual
SWB. As confirmed by the lower values of the AIC and BIC in model 3 versus model 4, the use
of a hierarchical model results in a better fit of the data. Interestingly, the same comparison
between model 3 (version FCM) versus model 3 (version FCM_isnt) makes this last model
preferred. This further supports the case for using an instrumental variable of FCM.
Regarding specific level 1 variables from model 3, our evidence shows a positive effect on SWB
in the cases of MARRIED-COUPLE, SECONDARY and HIGHER EDUCATION, HEALTH,
RELIGION, NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD and the PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME). As
for variables that affects SWB negatively, they are AGE, GENDER, UNEMPLOYED,
INDIGENE, NUMBER OF HOUSHOLD MEMBERS and PERCENTILE 1-10 OF
17

Ln(INCOME). While these results were expected, the significant effect of NEIGHBORHOOD
BOARD must be highlighted, as it sheds light on the relevance of community life and the
potential role of municipalities in building social capital. Concerning municipal-time variables,
the dummy for 2013 (DUMMY_2013) is significant and positive. This is consistent with the
rapid changes that the country went through between 2011 and 2013. Based on data from regular
household surveys, the country moved from US$13.144 to US$14.755 per head (World Bank pp
data), and the poverty rate declined from 22.2 to 14.4 percent on said span. Variable HOSPITAL
ACCESS (level 3) is only significant at 7.4 percent in model 3 and at 5 percent in model 4,
which suggests that the distance to basic services matters.
Table 2: Hierarchical Ordinal Logit Model for SWB in Chile.
Model 1(1)
A. Fixed Part
A.1. Individual Variable (5)
GENDER
AGE
AGE2
MARRIED-COUPLE
PRIMARY EDUCATION
SECONDARY EDUCATION
HIGHER EDUCATION
UNEMPLOYED
HEALTH
RELIGION
INDIGENE
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF Ln(INCOME)

Model 2(2)

-0.008
(0.0133)
-0.035***
(0.002)
0.0004***
(1.78e-05)
0.343***
(0.013)
-0.0374
(0.033)
0.170***
(0.0336)
0.474***
(0.037)
-0.444***
(0.031)
0.317***
(0.00495)
0.318***
(0.0204)
-0.0841***
(0.0193)
0.060***
(0.020)
-0.039***
(0.004)
-0.0295***
(0.002)

Model 3(3)

Model 4(4)

FCM

FCM_INST

FCM_INST

-0.023*
(0.0136)
-0.034***
(0.002)
0.0004***
(1.81e-05)
0.337***
(0.013)
-0.0451
(0.033)
0.159***
(0.0340)
0.460***
(0.037)
-0.432***
(0.032)
0.319***
(0.00503)
0.321***
(0.0207)
-0.0802***
(0.0194)
0.052**
(0.020)
-0.038***
(0.004)
-0.0298***
(0.002)

-0.023*
(0.0136)
-0.034***
(0.002)
0.0004***
(1.81e-05)
0.337***
(0.013)
-0.0428
(0.033)
0.162***
(0.0340)
0.467***
(0.037)
-0.431***
(0.032)
0.319***
(0.00503)
0.323***
(0.0207)
-0.0881***
(0.0194)
0.053***
(0.021)
-0.038***
(0.004)
-0.0297***
(0.002)

-0.017
(0.0162)
-0.034***
(0.003)
0.0004***
(1.95e-05)
0.334***
(0.026)
-0.0470
(0.108)
0.171
(0.124)
0.504***
(0.144)
-0.436***
(0.007)
0.315***
(0.101)
0.302***
(0.00628)
-0.106***
(0.00865)
0.054***
(0.002)
-0.036***
(0.0003)
-0.0287***
(0.002)
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PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME)

0.032***
(0.0015)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.031***
(0.002)

0.387***
(0.032)
-0.257***
(0.052

0.398***
(0.031)

0.380***
(0.036)

-0.255***
(0.033)

-0.201***
(0.011)

0.0045
(0.082)

0.113
(0.074)

0.062*
(0.037)

-3.323***
(0.042)
-2.022***
(0.038)
-0.168***
(0.037)
1.290***
(0.038)

-3.517***
(0.133)
-2.219***
(0.132)
-0.365***
(0.131)
1.095***
(0.132)

-3.913***
(0.141)
-2.615***
(0.140)
-0.761***
(0.140)
0.699***
(0.140)

-3.723**
(0.090)
-2.4326***
(0.092)
-0.5962***
(0.0323)
0.8439***
(0.029)

0.054
(28.940)

0.022
(0.888)

0.020
(6.493)

0.008

0.008

0.010

(0.011)
0.075
(28.94)

(0.011)
0.068
(0.888)

(0.011)
0.062
(6.493)

A.2. Municipality-Time Variables
DUMMY_2013
Log(FCM)
Log(FCM_INST)
A.3. Municipality Variables
HOSPITAL ACCESS
A.4. Thresholds
𝑘1: Cut1 constant

-3.602***
(0.020
-2.300***
𝑘2: Cut2 constant
(0.017)
-0.554***
𝑘3: Cut3 constant
(0.0155)
0.799***
𝑘4: Cut4 constant
(0.016)
B. Random Part: Variances and Covariances(6)
Level 2 Variance (U0jk)
0.051
(50.984)
Level 2 Variance (NEIGHBORHOOD
BOARD )
Level 3 Variance (V00k)

0.081
(50.984)

1.49e-18
1.58e-10

Variance (ijk)
C. Other Statistics and Contrasts
No. Obs.
No. of groups (municipality-time)
No. Iteration of Adaptive Quadrature
No. Integration Points
Wall Clock Time
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC):
level 2
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC):
level 3
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
Log Likelihood:
LR test vs. ordinal logit model:
chi2(3)
Prob > chi2
Cox & Snell pseudo R-squared
Deviance:
Prob > chi2(1)
D. Testing Parallel Lines Assumption
Wald test for the final model:
chi2(7)
Prob > chi2

200,690
648
29
8
00:19:32

101,555
647
50
8
02:57:01

98,485
633
45
8
02:21:45

98,485
633
44
8
03:35:12

0.038

0.038

0.029

0.025

0.024

0.022

0.022

0.019

539,959.03
540,020.29
269,973.52

260,637.19
260,846.81

252,652.67
252,890.11
126,301.34

252,618.66
252,856.10

253,516.71
253,526.21

-126.284.33

-126,757.35

4,737.39
0.000
25.012
3.704e-06

-130,296.59
1,511.07
0.000
6.160e-07
23.555
7.675e-06

1,092.51
0.000
-7.236e-13
23.493
7.918e-06

946.05
0.000
-3.220e-14
23.493
7.919e-06

14.00
0.122

20.08
0.169

22.70
0.091

98,485
2
111
8
00:02:24

22.70
0.091
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(1)

Model 1. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept
Model 2. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept and explanatory variable (level 1)
(3)
Model 3. Multilevel ordered logistic: random intercept and explanatory variable (level 1, 2, and 3)
(4)
Model 4. Ordered logistic: Random-effects
(5)
The individual variables AGE, HEALTH, NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD, NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS,
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF Ln(INCOME), and PERCENTILE 90-99 OF Ln(INCOME) are group mean centering:
municipality-time.
(6)
The standard error is in brackets.
(7)
Degrees of freedom chi2: i) model 2: 9; model 3 FCM: 15; iii) model 3 Instrumental FCM: 15; and model 4: 15.
(2)

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Z value in brackets. “Not at all happy”
is the reference category.

Predicted Probablities
On further analysis, predicted probabilities for different levels of fiscal decentralization
are presented in Figures 1 (lowest SWB) to 5 (highest SWB) below. Separate expected values are
recorded for each SWB bracket. Said predictions were made under the assumption that all
covariates but “FCM inst” are measured at its average municipal level. As showed in the figures,
FCM_isnst varies between 5.7 and 55.7. If all hypotheses that advocate fiscal decentralization on
different grounds were valid, we should get a negative relationship in the graphs.
Nonetheless, prima facie evidence from the figures suggests that the effect of fiscal
decentralization depends on the level of individual SWB being considered. For individuals in the
lower level of life satisfaction (Figure 1), our simulation shows that as FCM rises, our predicted
probability also rises until it reaches a plateau for values of FCM_inst above 4 percent. The same
analysis on the second level of life satisfaction (Figure 2) tells a similar story for lower levels of
FCM_ inst. The curve only turns over for values of FCM_inst above 16 percent. A similar
pattern is observed for the third level of SWB. Only levels 4 and 5 exhibit a behavior that is fully
compatible with the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization improves SWB. In light of
simulations below, a reinterpretation of the effect that FD brings about is in order. As shown
above, a first step toward a more comprehensive interpretation is the acknowledgement that, on
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average, FD does have a positive effect on the probability of individuals having a higher degree
of life satisfaction (Table 3). The question then remains as to why this general conclusion does
not necessarily holds for specific life satisfaction categories. The answer probably lies in two
factors: one is the nature of our FD proxy being used; the other is the set of priorities of
individuals at each SWB level.
As for the first factor, FCM equals the share of all municipal revenues coming from an
unconditional compensation transfer. While various factors are considered in the existing intermunicipal distribution formula, they are all targeted to provide more resources to municipalities
with a low tax base and poor socioeconomic indicators. Those are often the ones in which basic
local services are precarious or even non-existent, which includes irregular or incomplete
garbage collection, under-equipped primary health centers, low-quality local public education
(Letelier and Ormeño 2018), badly maintained streets and deficient local infrastructure, among
other shortages. As stated above, a higher grant-based contribution allows residents to access
basic services that would not be available otherwise. At the other end, for individuals who rank
high in the SWB scale, access to basic services is likely to be resolved. This may occur either
because they reside in relatively wealthy municipalities where these needs are well attended or
because they can afford privately funded community services not directly provided by the
municipality they live in. One example is the case of high-standard gated communities, which
very often have security of their own and maintain important privately funded commons. To this
must be added the access to private health care services and private education. Public provision
of these services is regularly administered by the municipal level in Chile.
Thus, we should expect that most benefits from fiscal decentralization become apparent
once a minimum of local public goods provision is reached. Once that threshold is overcome,
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local authorities are more likely to be in a position to innovate, devote a more need-oriented
provision of services, take proper advantage of the local tax base and be accountable for their
skills to make a good match between local resources and the quality of local public goods being
provided. In the case of Chile, it can be assumed that as long as municipalities are unable to
secure a minimally accepted standard in the six exclusive competencies established by law, they
will not make a significant effort to provide—let alone improve—high-quality local services that
fall into the set of shared responsibilities referred to above.
Based on the above arguments, we may hypothesize that individuals in the lower brackets
of SWB are more likely to live in high-FCM municipalities in which low-quality local public
goods dominate. The opposite occurs to high-SWB individuals (Figure 5), who mostly reside in
high-quality local public goods communities. Under the assumption that most high-level SWB
individuals enjoy reasonably good community services, we may expect this group to be
positively affected by FD. As far as municipal funding is concerned, individuals who face
important shortages in their life conditions and a poor community environment will see the level
of funding as a main source of concern, regardless of the source of these revenues. Benefits from
FD will only become apparent once a minimally acceptable local service provision is secured
and the local mayor and his/her team are able to extend their action over the ample range of
complementary functions defined by law.
Since our FD proxy measures the share of unconditional grants over the whole of
municipal revenues, a pending question is whether the above interpretation of results still holds
for any type of grants. Two reflections are in order. First, under a full revenue equalization
scenario, the revenue “level” effect referred to above is irrelevant, so that FD is expected to have
a positive effect on SWB regardless of the individual in question. Given that FCM is far from
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achieving such full inter-municipal equalization (Ahmad et al. 2015), the effect of FD is different
for different individuals. Second, this is not expected to be the case for conditional grants, which
in the Chilean case, are not officially part of the municipal budget.11

11

Municipalities in Chile have to apply to capital grants intended to improve local infrastructure. Nonetheless, they only count on
the FCM for their regular expenditures.
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Conclusions
This research provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that FD raises individual
SWB. Our results suggest that local own revenues, as opposed to transfers, are more likely to
make local authorities more accountable to residents as well as make residents themselves more
aware of the fiscal effort made by representatives. While this should not be interpreted as
evidence against the use of equalizing grants, it calls our attention about the potential negative
effects of imposing restrictions on the local leeway to charge taxes of their own or decide on
their tax rate, tax bases and potential tax rebates. The remaining covariates used in our empirical
analysis exhibit effects in line with theoretical predictions, most of which have been taken to test
in previous empirical research.
However clear on average, the benefits from FD appear to differ across specific SWB
levels. Expectedly, individuals in the lower levels of SWB are more likely to reside in
municipalities with lower levels of public services, in which access to basic services is limited
and of a lower quality. In such a case, the level of funding is at least as—or even more—
important than the composition of revenues. Despite that more funding through unconditional
grants leads to increasing degrees of fiscal “centralization,” it allows individuals to gain
enjoyment from a minimally accepted provision of basic community services. Benefits of FD are
likely to show up once a local funding threshold is exceeded, after which local authorities get
wider power to innovate and control their own revenues. Reported simulations based on our
empirical model offer supportive evidence of this, as FD appears to have a non-ambiguous
positive effect for the two highest brackets of SWB only.
Some policy recommendations can be drawn from our reported results. First, the way in
which local governments get their funding matters. In the case of Chile, municipal governments
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exhibit important differences in this respect, as some of them get most of their funding from the
FCM. Since the existing law on municipal revenues gives very little if any leeway for
municipalities to determine local taxes, it seems recommendable to strengthen local autonomy in
this respect. This is likely to make residents feel closer to local decisions and turn majors and
local authorities into genuine protagonists of their community development. Second, the very
uneven inter-municipal distribution of tax bases in Chile calls for a redesign of the FCM formula.
On the one hand, a more generous contribution from the national government to this
redistribution fund is highly desirable so that municipal fiscal autonomy could be strengthened.
On the other, the assignment of this fund across municipal governments must consider (among
other factors) fiscal capacity instead of actual revenues, as it is the case now. This would
preserve the link between municipal financial management on the one hand, and residents’
capacity to demand accountability from the authorities on the other.
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Appendix
Definition and Measurement of Variables
Individual Variables (Source: CASEN 2011 and 2013)
Definition
Measurement

Variable
HAPPY_5

Life satisfaction

Completely dissatisfied or little satisfied (1) to
very satisfied or completely satisfied (5).

GENDER

Gender

Men (1), and others (0)

AGE

Age

Since 15 years old

Marital status: married or lives in
couple
Level of studies: primary
education
Level of studies: secondary
education

Married or they live in couple (1), and other
states (0)

MARRIED-COUPLE
PRIMARY EDUCATION
SECONDARY EDUCATION

Primary studies (1), and other levels studies (0)
Secondary studies (1), and other levels studies
(0)
Higher education (1), and other levels studies
(0)

HIGHER EDUCATION

Level of studies: higher education

UNEMPLOYED

Labor status

Unemployed (1), and others (0)

HEALTH

Health level

Very bad (0), and very good (6)

Participation in religious
organizations or the church
Membership to an indigenous
people
Participation in neighborhood
board or another organization
territorial

Participate in a religious organization or church
(1), and other (0)

RELIGION
INDIGENE
NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD
HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
PERCENTILE 1-10 OF
INCOME
PERCENTILE 90-99 OF
INCOME

Indigene (1), and other (0)
Participate in neighborhood board (1), and
other (0)

Number of household members
Percentile 1-10 of income

Percentile 1-10 of neperian logarithm income

Percentile 90-99 income

Percentile 90-99 of neperian logarithm income

Municipal-level Variables (Source: SUBDERE 2011 and 2013)
FCM*

FCM dependency rate

FCM_INST*

Instrumental variable for FCM

ACCES TO HOSPITALS**

Access to Hospital

Percentage of all municipal revenues
represented by the “Fondo Común Municipal”
(FCM)
See estimation formula in the fourth section
above
SUBDERE

*SINIM, **Estudio Caracterización de Territorios Aislados 2011 (SUBDERE)
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